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Abstract In research on the political economy of exchange rates, a good under-
standing of who will endorse and who will oppose certain exchange-rate policies is
central to understanding how actual exchange-rate policies are made and how the
global exchange-rate system changes over time+ Since existing classifications of
exchange-rate level preferences have several shortcomings, this article proposes a
new and more nuanced strategy for identifying preferences on exchange-rate valu-
ation+ This approach takes into account the complex interrelationship between
exchange-rate and monetary policy, and the effects of these policies on balance sheets+
In addition, the approach accounts for the dynamics of preference formation and
change+ Comparative case studies of currency crises in Hong Kong, South Korea,
Thailand, and Taiwan show that considering actors’ vulnerabilities to exchange-rate
and interest-rate changes enhances understanding of their exchange-rate level pref-
erences+ The case studies also indicate that societal preferences affect policy out-
comes+ Exchange-rate stability was maintained in countries where private actors’
vulnerabilities to depreciation were high+ However, when pressure intensified,
exchange rates were subsequently depreciated in countries where vulnerabilities to
a monetary tightening exceeded the potential costs of depreciation+
How economic policies affect preferences is an important question, both in theo-
retical and policy terms+ For example, some actors benefit from a fixed exchange
rate, whereas others are hurt by such an exchange-rate regime+ Some actors bene-
fit from an appreciating exchange rate, while for others a depreciating currency is
more advantageous+ In combination with domestic and international institutions,
such societal pressures are widely understood to affect actual policy outcomes as
well as the global exchange-rate system+1 Gaining a good understanding of who
will endorse and who will oppose certain exchange-rate policies is therefore cen-
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tral to understanding how actual exchange-rate policies are made and how the sys-
tem changes over time+ An essential concern in this endeavor is to identify the
policy preferences of key actors correctly+
Interest in this topic has surged in recent years+ Many studies have underscored
the impact of interest group preferences on exchange-rate policymaking+2 Much of
this work has been based on Frieden’s influential classification of interest group pref-
erences regarding the flexibility and the level of the exchange rate+3 However, while
most evidence supports his classification’s predictions on exchange-rate flexibil-
ity, the model fares less well with regard to exchange rate-level preferences+ Recent
survey research shows that respondents frequently report other preferences than
those predicted+4 Similar to these surveys, Leblang does not find a significant effect
of export-sector strength on the probability of a depreciation in periods of specu-
lative exchange-market pressure+5 This suggests that a more nuanced understand-
ing of exchange-rate level preferences is needed+
The current classification of short-term preferences for exchange-rate levels dis-
tinguishes mostly between producers of tradable and nontradable goods+ Unfortu-
nately, this distinction neglects three crucial aspects of exchange-rate policy+ First,
in today’s world of mobile capital, choices regarding the level of the exchange rate
are intricately linked to monetary policy+ For example, maintaining an appreciated
exchange rate quite often requires tight monetary policy to attract sufficient inter-
national capital+ Choosing an exchange-rate level therefore involves not only a trade-
off between international competitiveness and national purchasing power but also
between the effects of a change in the exchange rate and the effects of a change in
the interest rate+ Second, firms and individuals worry about both their international
competitiveness and their balance sheets+ Recent studies have emphasized this con-
cern by arguing that domestic groups tend to advocate those exchange-rate poli-
cies that reduce their particular financial vulnerabilities+ Hall and Woodruff show
that severe currency mismatches in interest groups’ balance sheets—a relatively
common phenomenon in developing countries and emerging markets—lead to a
strong preference against depreciation+6 Shambaugh finds that reliance on differ-
ent types of capital generate distinct capital-specific exchange-rate regime prefer-
ences+7 Taken with studies that have highlighted the importance of competitiveness
concerns,8 these findings indicate that both balance-sheet and competitiveness con-
siderations affect preferences regarding the level of exchange rates+ Because changes
in exchange and interest rates can have different effects on actors’ competitiveness
2+ See Frieden 1991, 1996, and 2002; Frieden and Stein 2001; Hefeker 1997 and 2000; Blomberg,
Frieden, and Stein 2005; Hall 2005; Helleiner 2005; Pisa 2006; and Steinberg 2006+
3+ Frieden 1991+
4+ See Cleeland Knight 2007; and Duckenfield and Aspinwall 2007+
5+ Leblang 2003+
6+ See Hall 2005; and Woodruff 2005,
7+ Shambaugh 2004+
8+ See, for example, Frieden, Ghezzi, and Stein 2001; Frieden 2002; and Blomberg, Frieden, and
Stein 2005+
406 International Organization
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e.
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f B
as
el
 L
ib
ra
ry
, o
n 
11
 Ju
l 2
01
7 
at
 0
7:
31
:5
1 ,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
C
am
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s.
 h
tt
ps
:/
/d
oi
.o
rg
/1
0.
10
17
/S
00
20
81
83
08
08
01
44
and balance sheets, exchange-rate level preferences are likely to be influenced by
the interaction of these effects, rather than by any single effect+ Finally, existing
studies’ static predictions of short-run preferences fail to explain why short-run pref-
erences about exchange-rate policy outcomes sometimes change quite suddenly from
maintaining exchange-rate stability to depreciating and vice versa+9
This article offers a dynamic explanation of exchange-rate level preferences that
builds on previous work but addresses these three shortcomings+ It focuses on the
choice between exchange-rate stability and depreciation10 and argues that individ-
uals and firms advocate or oppose depreciating the currency depending on their vul-
nerability to such an adjustment, relative to their vulnerability to policies that
maintain exchange-rate stability, in particular monetary tightening+ Actors’ overall
vulnerability consists of three different components: their vulnerability to changes
in real prices, and their balance sheets’ vulnerability to both depreciation and
interest-rate increases+ ~Changes in the price of imported and exported goods and
services affect actors’ competitiveness and purchasing power+ Balance sheets, on
the other hand, are affected when exchange-rate and interest-rate movements change
the value of liabilities and assets+! By assessing these components and accounting
for mutually offsetting effects, each actor’s overall vulnerability to depreciation and
to maintaining ~or “defending”! currency stability can be determined+ Based on the
assumption that actors always prefer those policy outcomes to which they are least
vulnerable, each actor’s preferred policy choice can then be deduced on the basis
of this overall vulnerability+ The dynamics of changing policy preferences arise when
discounting mechanisms and the uncertainty surrounding the probability of a full-
blown crisis cause actors to selectively focus on their vulnerability to depreciation
only, rather than considering the trade-off between their vulnerabilities to depreci-
ation and monetary tightening+ As these perceptions of vulnerability are adjusted,
exchange-rate level preferences can be expected to change as well+
The predictions of this argument are empirically evaluated with four compara-
tive case studies of speculative attacks on the currencies of Hong Kong, South
Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand in 1997–98, for which I analyze actors’ exchange-
rate level preferences and their effect on policy outcomes+ All four countries ini-
tially maintained exchange-rate stability but responded differently when strong
speculative pressure emerged+ The case studies suggest that perceived and actual
vulnerabilities contribute to understanding the variation in actors’ exchange-rate
and monetary policy preferences+ In tranquil periods, actors prefer exchange-rate
stability when their perceived or actual vulnerability to depreciation is high+ How-
ever, when strong pressure emerges, actors whose vulnerabilities to monetary tight-
ening exceed their vulnerability to depreciation begin to favor depreciation instead+
The case studies also indicate that societal preferences influenced policy out-
9+ They do provide dynamic arguments for long-term preference change ~for example, Frieden 1994!+
10+ Most often exchange-rate level preferences center on the question of whether to depreciate or
not+ The argument can be extended to include the less frequent case of voluntary appreciation+
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comes in these countries+ When the private sector’s vulnerability to depreciation
was high, the authorities typically defended the exchange rate+ In countries where
influential actors were also highly vulnerable to interest-rate increases, these
defenses were later abandoned when pressure intensified+
The article’s main contribution is threefold+ First, by taking into account the
impact of monetary policy, the joint effect of price and balance-sheet consider-
ations, and the dynamics of preference formation, it proposes a more nuanced strat-
egy for identifying exchange-rate level preferences+ Second, it shows empirically
that this approach can account for variation in these preferences across actors and
across time+ In particular, it offers an explanation for the puzzling cases of Korea
and Thailand, where policymakers delayed devaluation until an orderly exit from
the peg was no longer possible+ Finally, it shows that time-inconsistent policymak-
ing can be encouraged not just by institutions, but that policy preferences can have
a strong short-term bias as well+
Private-Sector Vulnerabilities and Exchange-Rate
Level Preferences
Vulnerability to changes in exchange-rate and monetary policy consist of three
components: firms’ and individuals’ concern about competitiveness and real prices,
the vulnerability of their balance sheets to depreciation, and their balance-sheet
vulnerability to interest-rate increases+ Of course, in the long run these exchange-
rate and interest-rate vulnerabilities are endogenous to the exchange-rate regime
type and other institutions such as central bank independence or the quality and
extent of government regulation+ The focus in this article is on short-term prefer-
ences, however, because these are likely to matter most in a policymaking con-
text+11 In the short term, these vulnerabilities act as exogenous constraints on the
formation of preferences+
Competitiveness and Purchasing Power Concerns
Changes in the exchange rate strongly affect real prices, at least in the short to
medium run+ Because depreciation lowers the international price of exports, it
promotes export growth by increasing their international competitiveness+12 Con-
sequently, export-oriented industries are usually believed to favor a more depre-
ciated exchange rate+13 When the depreciation contributes to a realignment of the
11+ Frieden 1991+
12+ See Forbes 2002; Echeverry et al+ 2003; and Pratap, Lobato, and Somuano 2003, for some empir-
ical studies on this topic+
13+ Frieden 1991 and 2002; Frieden, Ghezzi, and Stein 2001; Leblang 2003; and Blomberg, Frieden,
and Stein 2005+
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currency, it can also stimulate the economy as a whole+ However, depreciation
also increases the price of imports and puts upward pressure on the inflation rate+
Such price increases hurt consumers and firms that strongly rely on internation-
ally tradable inputs and imported goods+ If exchange-rate stability and the result-
ing stability of the investment environment is one of the main comparative
advantages of a country’s financial sector, depreciations can also damage finan-
cial firms’ competitiveness+
Of course, these positive and negative effects can partially offset each other+14
Most export-oriented firms also use imported intermediate goods and inputs such
as machinery, technology, or commodities+ Everybody is affected by depreciation-
induced inflation+ The effect of depreciations can therefore be ambiguous overall
when it comes to competitiveness and profitability, a finding that several firm-
level empirical studies confirm+15 Gauging the overall effect of exchange-rate pol-
icy on an actor’s competitiveness thus requires taking both the positive and negative
effects of depreciation into account+ The more actors rely on exported rather than
imported goods, the more they will profit from depreciation+ Similarly, the pur-
chasing power of actors with a high exposure to inflation or a high reliance on
imported goods is vulnerable to depreciation+ In contrast to depreciation, a mon-
etary tightening does not directly affect competitiveness+16
Balance-Sheet Vulnerability to Depreciation
Exchange-rate and monetary policy also profoundly affect balance sheets+Whether
actors prefer exchange-rate stability or a depreciation thus not only depends on their
competitiveness and purchasing power vulnerability but also on the composition
of their assets and liabilities+ Changes in the exchange rate affect foreign-currency-
denominated balance-sheet positions, which are quite common+Any firm with cross-
border transactions will typically exhibit items denominated in foreign currencies
in its balance sheets+More importantly, and particularly common in emerging mar-
kets, market participants borrow abroad ~or domestically but in a foreign cur-
rency!, either because international interest rates are lower than domestic rates or
because they are simply unable to borrow in their own currency+17 Their balance
sheets can consequently contain sizeable positions of foreign-currency-denominated
liabilities+ With such liabilities, a depreciation of the exchange rate considerably
increases the debt burden ~in terms of domestic currency!, particularly when these
liabilities are unhedged+ This effect is especially detrimental when balance sheets
are mismatched, that is, when assets—in contrast to liabilities—are predominantly
14+ Frieden, Ghezzi, and Stein 2001+
15+ Dollar and Hallward-Driemeier 2000; Forbes 2002; and Blaszkiewicz and Paczynski 2003+
16+ In the long run, monetary tightening can weaken competitiveness by making access to capital
more expensive and not depreciating can indirectly cause a loss in competitiveness if it leads to
overvaluation+
17+ Eichengreen and Hausmann 2005+
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denominated in domestic currency+18 Those whose balance sheets contain sizeable
and unmatched positions of foreign-currency-denominated liabilities can conse-
quently be expected to favor exchange-rate stability+19
Balance-Sheet Vulnerability to Monetary Tightening
Changes in the interest rate affect those balance-sheet positions denominated in
domestic currencies+ Higher interest rates increase the debt-servicing costs on
domestic liabilities, making it more difficult and costly to repay these loans or to
undertake new investments+ This effect is particularly severe when the loans’ inter-
est rates are closely tied to short-term interest rates and when debtors have not
hedged their liabilities+20 Monetary tightening is most painful for those debtors
who are either highly leveraged or already have difficulties servicing their debts+
In such instances, even a small increase in interest rates can cause major difficul-
ties for borrowers+ The current problems of low-quality mortgage holders in the
U+S+ housing market provide a vivid example of a group with a high vulnerability
to monetary tightening+
Most actors exhibit a mix of domestic-currency-denominated and foreign-
currency-denominated assets and liabilities+Actors with mixed balance sheets weigh
their vulnerability to depreciation relative to their vulnerability to interest-rate
increases+ The higher an actor’s weighted overall vulnerability to depreciation, the
more painful exchange-rate adjustments are likely to be+ Similarly, debtors with a
higher overall balance-sheet vulnerability to interest-rate increases will be harmed
more by an interest-rate defense than a depreciation+21
Deducing Preferences from Actors’ Overall Vulnerability
It should be clear by now that vulnerabilities to exchange-rate and monetary pol-
icy are far from homogeneous+ To capture the interaction of the three types of
vulnerability, I have constructed a vulnerability space to illustrate how the three
types of vulnerabilities interplay+ For representational purposes, I collapse the three
dimensions into a two-dimensional space by combining the two balance-sheet
18+ Even companies with balanced balance sheets can be harmed by depreciation if their customers
exhibit a mismatched portfolio+ Since depreciation raises the risk of default, they create a considerable
indirect credit risk ~Mishkin 1996!+Many recent economic models ~see, for example, Chang and Velasco
2001; and Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee 2004! have highlighted the role of such financial-sector
and balance-sheet weaknesses in the emergence of currency crises+
19+ Fiess and Shankar 2005 show that currency stabilization programs are more likely when levels
of foreign-currency-denominated liabilities are high+
20+ Central banks usually raise short-term interest rates to defend the exchange rate+
21+ Of course, this always also depends on the relative sizes of the changes in interest and exchange
rates+
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vulnerabilities+22 This new dimension, the vertical axis of the vulnerability space
in Figure 1, represents actors’ overall balance-sheet vulnerability, that is, their
balance-sheet vulnerability to depreciation less their balance-sheet vulnerability
to interest-rate increases+ Actors located in the upper half are highly vulnerable
to depreciation+ In contrast, the balance sheets of actors located in the lower half
are more vulnerable to increases in domestic interest rates+ The horizontal axis
represents the competitiveness and purchasing power vulnerability to deprecia-
tion and hence the classic distinction between tradables and nontradables produc-
ers+ The higher actors’ competitiveness vulnerability, the less beneficial are the
effects of a depreciation+ Actors situated to the left—such as export and import-
competing firms—are least vulnerable to ~or may even benefit from! deprecia-
tion, while firms using high quantities of imported inputs can typically be found
at the right-hand side of the continuum+
22+ The two dimensions are not necessarily independent for all actors+ For example, exporters tend
to have both a low competitiveness vulnerability and a low balance-sheet vulnerability to depreciation
as they are naturally hedged+ For many other actors, however, the two dimensions are not correlated+
FIGURE 1. The vulnerability space
Determining Exchange Rate Level Preferences 411
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Figure 1 shows how actors’ positions in this vulnerability space affect their pref-
erences on exchange-rate stability versus depreciation+ Because competitiveness
and balance-sheet effects can either offset or reinforce each other, the combina-
tion of the two effects in one space here makes it possible to deduce each actor’s
preferred policy outcome+ Actors located in the upper right-hand corner display a
high overall balance-sheet vulnerability to depreciation while at the same time
they are very exposed to price changes in imported goods+ One can expect these
actors to strongly prefer a defense to a depreciation+ For actors located in the lower
left-hand corner, by contrast, depreciations increase their competitiveness, while
their balance-sheet vulnerability to interest-rate increases greatly exceeds their
balance-sheet vulnerability to depreciation+ These actors tend to strongly prefer
depreciation to an interest-rate defense+ Most actors are likely to be located in
neither of these two corners but are more often found toward the middle of the
vulnerability space+ Since these actors have to offset balance-sheet and real-price
effects, their preferences regarding exchange-rate stability or depreciation are less
clear+ All else equal, actors positioned around the diagonal connecting the upper
left-hand and the lower right-hand corner can be expected to be indifferent or in
favor of an intermediate response such as a combination of exchange-rate and
interest-rate adjustment+ The farther away an actor is located from the diagonal,
the more pronounced is his preference for a defense or a depreciation, with actors
in the upper-right triangle favoring an interest-rate defense and actors in the lower-
left triangle favoring an adjustment through changes in the exchange rate+
Preference Dynamics
Certain actors sometimes switch from preferring exchange-rate stability to depre-
ciation ~and vice versa!+ The dynamics arise because maintaining exchange-rate
stability in tranquil times is different from maintaining it in periods of severe
exchange-market pressure+ In tranquil times, when the exchange rate is properly
valued and faces no upward or downward market pressure, maintaining a given
exchange-rate level comes at relatively little cost in terms of monetary policy+ Even
mild speculative pressure can be countered by sterilized intervention in the for-
eign exchange market, which also has a limited effect on domestic interest rates+
However, in periods of severe pressure, sterilized reserve sales are typically no
longer sufficient to offset market forces+ In the face of severe pressure, keeping
exchange rates stable requires painful measures, most notably a significant tight-
ening of monetary conditions+ Higher interest rates make investments in domestic
currency more attractive and hence stop, or at least slow down, the outflow of
capital, while at the same time signaling the government’s commitment to the
exchange-rate peg+
While monetary tightening has a strong negative effect on actors with a high
vulnerability to interest-rate increases, these actors are not negatively affected by
sterilized sales of foreign reserves+ In periods of tranquility or mild exchange-
market pressure, they therefore tend to discount their interest-rate vulnerability
412 International Organization
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and focus only on the effects of a potential depreciation on real prices and their
foreign-currency-denominated balance-sheet positions+ This biases their assess-
ment of their vulnerability toward the effects of a depreciation and tends to dis-
count the potential effects of a monetary tightening+ Graphically, this emphasis on
the effects of depreciation shifts their perceived position in the vulnerability space
vertically upward+23 With a high discount rate, this shift corresponds roughly to
the amount of each actor’s interest-rate vulnerability+ In contrast, in periods of
speculative pressure the full trade-off between exchange-rate and interest-rate sta-
bility becomes acute+ Actors consequently base their policy preference on more
accurate assessments of their actual overall vulnerability in these periods+ The dif-
ference between their perceived and their actual vulnerability can cause certain
actors with a high interest-rate vulnerability to prefer different policy responses in
tranquil and mild-pressure periods than in severe-pressure periods, preferring
exchange-rate stability in the former and a depreciation in the latter case+24
Despite this change in strategies, actors are consistent in their preference struc-
ture and always prefer the policy outcome to which they are least vulnerable+ It is
the change in their perceived overall vulnerability that leads to a reassessment of
their preferred policy outcome+ Two factors cause rational actors to perceive their
vulnerability differently in tranquil and in speculative pressure environments: dis-
counting and uncertainty+ Discounting means that individuals and firms place greater
weight on short-term trade-offs than on possible long-term trade-offs+25 Starting
from a no-pressure environment, actors discount the possibility that interest rates
may need to be raised in the future to keep exchange rates stable+ Experimental
research has shown that people tend to take more risks when choosing between
negative prospects and to discard extremely unlikely outcomes in their decision
calculus+26 In the context of exchange-rate policy, this means that most actors will
focus largely on the effects of a depreciation on their competitiveness and their
balance sheets as long as pressure is mild+ The uncertainty surrounding the prob-
ability and severity of a full-blown crisis and the costs of accurately assessing
such probability reinforce this discounting mechanism+ Since it is uncertain whether
and when severe pressure will actually materialize in the future, actors further
discount the potential effects of a monetary tightening+Moreover, because the com-
plex interrelationship between the exchange rate and the interest rate is not com-
monly understood,27 the perceived vulnerability against the inclusion of interest-
rate concerns in tranquil periods faces further negative prejudice+
23+ This is because the vertical axis then represents the difference between actors’ balance-sheet
vulnerability to depreciation and their discounted balance-sheet vulnerability to monetary tightening+
24+ Of course, actors’ actual vulnerability can change as well+ Firms may, for example, decide to
hedge when they fear that severe speculative pressure is about to emerge+ However, a significant shift
of an actor’s position in the vulnerability space usually requires a restructuring to an extent that is not
possible in the short run+
25+ For an overview over the literature on discounting, see Streich and Levy 2007+
26+ Kahneman and Tversky 1979+
27+ McNamara 1998+
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From Preferences to Policy Outcomes
Except for large, influential companies, firms and individuals do not usually lobby
the authorities directly but engage in collective action to influence policy out-
comes in their favor+ How successful these actors are in having their preferences
translated into policy depends on the homogeneity of their vulnerability profiles,
group size, and on the institutional setting+28
The degree of vulnerability-homogeneity depends on both broad sectoral and
firm-level characteristics such as export-orientation or size+ Both theoretical and
empirical work in finance indicates that certain types of firms share similar vul-
nerability profiles, while other groups of firms tend to be more diverse+29 One impor-
tant distinction can be made between the financial sector ~banks and other financial
institutions! and the nonfinancial private-sector ~corporations and households!+30
Firm-level evidence on nonfinancial firms in both Latin America31 and Asia32 shows
that both size and export-orientation strongly affect nonfinancial firms’ capital struc-
ture+ Large firms and producers of tradables tend to hold much higher shares of
foreign currency debt than small firms and producers of nontradables+ Firm size
also tends to affect firms’ overall leverage and therefore the salience they attach to
monetary and exchange-rate policy+ Consequently, the vulnerability structure of
large export-oriented firms is likely to differ from that of small nontradables firms+
This suggests that despite the importance of firm-level variations, the average char-
acter and the homogeneity of firms’ vulnerability structures will vary among dif-
ferent groups of firms+
Firms and individuals also differ in their ability to organize+ Small groups of actors
with similar vulnerability profiles ~and hence preferences! are much easier to orga-
nize than large groups, especially when these larger groups have heterogenous pref-
erences+33 This organizational advantage is enhanced when actors sharing similar
vulnerabilities concentrate along preexisting organizational lines+ For example, when
banks in a country share similar competitiveness and balance-sheet vulnerabilities
to changes in the exchange and interest rate, they can easily mobilize based on the
preexisting structure of a banking association+Larger, less organized, and more hetero-
genous groups of actors tend to be less influential politically+
The institutional setting can also affect groups’ influence on policy outcomes in
an indirect way+34 Upcoming elections, for example, give voters—and hence, the
large and heterogenous group of consumers and homeowners—much more voice
than they would have in nonelection periods+ The effect of their preferences on
28+ Ostrom 2007+
29+ For an overview, see Harris and Raviv 1991+
30+ Allen et al+ 2002+ The sectoral balance-sheet approach proposed by these authors was adopted
by the IMF as one of its surveillance and currency crisis prevention instruments in 2002+
31+ See Galindo, Panizza, and Schiantarelli 2003; and Bleakley and Cowan 2005+
32+ Hallward-Driemeier 2001+
33+ Olson 1965+
34+ Walter and Willett 2007+
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policy outcomes is indirect: although they are unlikely to lobby the authorities
directly, when elections are approaching, the government is nevertheless likely to
take their preferences into account+
Since the focus of this study is on preference formation, I assume a simple mech-
anism for how preferences translate into politics: the policy outcome depends on
the distribution of politically influential depreciation proponents and opponents in
favor and against depreciation+When influential actors favor exchange-rate stabil-
ity regardless of the severity of speculative pressure, policymakers can be expected
to defend the exchange rate at all cost+ When most actors have a higher overall
vulnerability to depreciation, a prompt depreciation is the likely outcome+ In a
third type of economy, a majority of influential actors perceives themselves more
vulnerable to depreciation in tranquil periods even though their actual vulnerabil-
ity is higher with regard to monetary tightening+ In these countries one can expect
a currency defense as long as it can be achieved through sterilized reserve sales,
but a depreciation as soon as a significant monetary tightening becomes necessary
to maintain exchange-rate stability+
Empirical Evaluation: Four Comparative
Case Studies
To empirically evaluate the usefulness of the vulnerability argument for identify-
ing preferences, I analyze exchange-rate level preferences in the context of emerg-
ing speculative pressure on exchange rates+ Currency crisis episodes are particularly
fit for an analysis of the vulnerability argument because exchange-rate prefer-
ences are very visible during such crises,35 and because the monetary policy dimen-
sion becomes salient when speculative pressure turns severe+ Exchange-rate policy
outcomes during currency crisis periods can be classified into three ideal types:
~1! prompt depreciation, in which policymakers depreciate as soon as mild spec-
ulative pressure emerges; ~2! successful defense, in which the exchange-rate level
is successfully maintained; and ~3! the puzzling case of unsuccessful defense, in
which policymakers defend the exchange rate until reserves are ~almost! depleted
and subsequently let the currency depreciate+ If policymakers are susceptible to
societal preferences, different constellations in favor or against depreciation should
influence exchange-rate policy outcomes+
To evaluate the usefulness of the vulnerability argument, I compare the distri-
bution of societal preferences in Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand
during the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98+36 The twofold research strategy focuses
35+ Broz and Frieden 2001+
36+ Since a selection of cases based on the independent variable was impossible due to the complex
nature of the independent variable ~actors’ perceived and actual locations in the vulnerability space!, I
selected the cases in a way that maximized variation on the dependent variable, held important control
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both on the question of whether actors’ preferences can be correctly inferred from
their vulnerability structures and on the question of the extent these preferences
affected how policymakers responded to the currency crises in their countries+ The
analysis is based on information obtained in thirty semi-structured expert inter-
views with central bankers, government officials, International Monetary Fund
~IMF! staff, and academics, who had detailed knowledge about the condition and
preferences of firms and interest groups in these countries+37 To obtain informa-
tion about the vulnerability structure of influential actors, the interviewed experts
were first asked to identify the relevant groups of actors and to rate their influence
on the policy outcome+ They were next asked to identify for each of these groups
their preferred policy or policy mix, both during the buildup to the crisis and amidst
full speculative pressure+ Finally, experts had to specify groups’ vulnerabilities
with regard to both competitiveness0purchasing power concerns and balance-
sheet considerations+38 This information was augmented with information from sec-
ondary literature, newspaper sources, and official documents, and validated with
confidential information from the archives of the German Bundesbank+39
Several commonalities make the speculative attacks in these four countries par-
ticularly suitable cases for comparison+ First, the attacks occurred during the same
bearish global market conditions and with similar speculator sentiments+ Second,
the authorities in all four countries had been routinely intervening in the foreign
exchange market for quite some time+ Third, at the time of the crisis all four coun-
tries were export-oriented and had begun liberalizing their capital accounts, enabling
domestic economic actors to accumulate foreign-currency-denominated positions
in their balance sheets+ Fourth, in 1997 these countries displayed comparable lev-
els of civil liberties, which are an important prerequisite for domestic interest group
politics+
Table 1 summarizes how the authorities in the four countries responded to spec-
ulative pressure+ It presents a series of puzzles:What explains the different degrees
to which the authorities relied on interest-rate or exchange-rate adjustment and
reserve sales? Why, despite a high level of foreign currency reserves in both coun-
tries, did Taiwan choose to let its currency depreciate while Hong Kong chose to
defend? Why were the authorities in Thailand and Korea willing to spend almost
all their reserves in a desperate attempt to stabilize their exchange rates while simul-
taneously shying away from a significant increase in interest rates?
variables constant, and did not include any prior knowledge about the values of the independent vari-
able ~as suggested by King, Keohane, and Verba 1994!+ Several other Asian crisis cases were not cho-
sen because certain features made them unsuitable candidates for comparison+ Indonesia was excluded
because of its authoritarian political regime, the Philippines because they were not strongly affected
by the crisis, and Malaysia because of its unorthodox strategy of imposing capital controls+
37+ Author interviews were conducted between February and April 2006+ While the interviewed
experts are not personally identified in the text, their names and titles are listed in the Appendix+
38+ Regarding the last question, most respondents were able to give only rough qualitative estimates+
39+ An appendix with details about the materials and research strategies employed in the case stud-
ies is available from the author+
416 International Organization
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e.
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f B
as
el
 L
ib
ra
ry
, o
n 
11
 Ju
l 2
01
7 
at
 0
7:
31
:5
1 ,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
C
am
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s.
 h
tt
ps
:/
/d
oi
.o
rg
/1
0.
10
17
/S
00
20
81
83
08
08
01
44
TABLE 1. Policy responses to speculative pressure in Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand
Hong Kong South Korea Taiwan Thailand
Intensity of
speculative
pressure
Mild
(July–
September
1997)
Severe
(October
1997/June–
August
1998)
Mild
(July–
October
1997)
Severe
(November
1997–
January
1998)
Mild
(July–
September
1997)
Severe
(October
1997)
Mild
(July
1996–
April
1997)
Severe
(May–
July
1997)
Interest rates F FFF r, laterF F, later FF* F f F F, later FF*
Foreign reserve
sales
F F FF F FF r FFF F
Exchange rate
level
r r r fff r ff r fff
Additional policy
measures
Tax relief Stock market
intervention
Some capital
account
liberalization
Roll-over
agreement
with foreign
banks
Some capital
controls
Policy outcome Exchange-rate
stability
Exchange-rate
stability
Exchange-rate
stability
Depreciation Exchange-rate
stability
Depreciation Exchange-rate
stability
Depreciation
Notes: * Mostly because of IMF conditionality+ F  mild increase; FF  intermediate increase; FFF  strong increase; r  no change; f  mild decrease; ff  intermediate decrease;
fff  strong decrease+
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 07:31:51, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818308080144
The four cases are particularly interesting because the most prominent alterna-
tive explanations for policy responses to speculative pressure can only partially
account for the variation in policy outcomes+ One set of alternative explanations
points to the different quality of countries’ economic fundamentals and foreign
reserves+ Countries experiencing fundamentals-based first-generation crises should
be much more likely to depreciate than countries struck by expectations-based,
second-generation-type crises+While the nature of the speculative attacks during the
Asian financial crisis has been hotly debated,40 it can be argued that Thailand was
most vulnerable to attack, followed by Korea and, to a smaller extent, Hong Kong
and Taiwan+41 The crisis-type argument can thus explain Thailand’s and Korea’s deci-
sion to depreciate in response to severe exchange-market pressure as well as the vari-
ance among Taiwan’s and Hong Kong’s responses ~their sound fundamentals and
high level of reserves enabled them to choose either policy response!, but it fails to
answer why Thailand and Korea desperately tried to hold on to their exchange-rate
pegs for so long and why Taiwan’s approach to resolving the crisis was so different
from Hong Kong’s+ The related argument that countries with more ~potential! access
to international funds ~in particular Hong Kong and Korea that were more capable
of defending than countries such as Taiwan, which lacked access to foreign funds!,42
can explain why Hong Kong defended while Taiwan depreciated fairly quickly and
why Thailand and Korea initially tried to defend their currencies, but it fails to
explain why Thailand lost even more reserves than Korea and why both countries
asked the IMF for help only after they already had depreciated+
Various political economy explanations also fail to explain the observed vari-
ance in exchange-rate policy outcomes in the four cases+ Frieden’s well-known
interest group argument,43 for example, can explain the policy outcomes in Hong
Kong and Taiwan, but it cannot account for Thailand’s and Korea’s determined
but fruitless efforts to defend the exchange rate+ Frieden argues that international
traders and investors, a very influential group in the Hong Kong economy, have a
preference for fixed ~and potentially overvalued! exchange rates+ In contrast, he
expects exporters, especially of standardized products, to have a preference for a
depreciated and more flexible exchange rate+While the prompt devaluation in Tai-
wan supports Frieden’s argument, it cannot explain why Korea and Thailand, two
equally export-oriented countries, were so reluctant to devalue+ Thailand’s unwill-
ingness is striking, especially considering that the country exports highly standard-
ized products+ With regard to another political economy explanation focusing on
40+ See, for example, Furman and Stiglitz 1998; Radelet and Sachs 1998; and Willett et al+ 2005+
41+ See Athukorala and Warr 2002; and Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini 1999+
42+ China’s pledge to support the exchange-rate link gave Hong Kong the largest access to foreign
funds+ South Korea’s geopolitical and economic importance also endowed it with considerable access
to foreign emergency funds+ This access was more limited for Thailand+ Given its difficult diplomatic
status and lack of membership in the Bretton Woods institutions, Taiwan’s access to international financ-
ing was limited+
43+ See Frieden 1991 and 2002; and Frieden and Stein 2001+
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the effect of the political regime type,44 the only regularity seems to be that the
more democratic countries ~Thailand and Korea! chose the intermediate and pain-
ful path of first defending and then devaluing+ A third argument, that defenses are
more likely shortly before elections, while devaluations are more likely after elec-
tions,45 has more traction+ The defenses in Hong Kong in the autumn of 1997 and
the initial exchange-rate defense in Korea can be attributed to upcoming elections,
and Taiwan’s prompt depreciation occurred shortly after elections had been held+
However, the electoral-timing explanation has less leverage with regard to the Thai
case or to Hong Kong’s defenses in the summer of 1998, where the absence of
close elections would lead one to expect a rapid devaluation+ Electoral timing also
has some difficulty in explaining why the Korean authorities abandoned their
exchange rate just one month before election day+
Finally, it could be argued that the different policy outcomes can be explained
by assuming an apolitical benevolent dictator who aims to maximize social wel-
fare+ The Taiwanese economy was much less vulnerable to a depreciation than
Hong Kong’s+ The authorities’ decision to devalue in the former and to defend in
the latter case is consequently consistent with the benevolent-dictator explanation+
However, the explanation is much less convincing with regard to the Thai and
Korean cases+ In both countries an early depreciation would have caused signifi-
cantly less pain than the authorities’ actual decision to tenaciously defend the
exchange rate as long as possible and then to devalue nevertheless+ This strategy
caused the currencies to overshoot and required drastic and painful countermea-
sures, which could have been avoided had the authorities abandoned their cur-
rency defense earlier+ It is interesting to note that the IMF had been recommending
more exchange-rate flexibility for both countries for some time before the crises
erupted+46 The authorities in both countries were consequently aware of the risks
involved in not depreciating, making this strategy an unlikely outcome for a social
welfare-maximizing policymaker+
The very different policy outcomes in the four countries are indeed puzzling+
As the discussion has shown, alternative explanations have particular difficulties
with explaining the cases of failed defenses+ For this reason, two of these cases,
Thailand and Korea, are included in the analysis to show that the vulnerability
argument offers an explanation for this variance+
Taiwan: Prompt Depreciation
Taiwan in 1997 is a case where most economic actors, notably the many small-
and medium-sized enterprises ~SMEs!, stock market investors, large corporations,
44+ See Simmons 1994; and Sattler and Walter 2006+
45+ See Leblang 2003; and Walter 2006+
46+ The IMF recommended more flexible rates for Thailand from 1994 onward, for Korea starting
in 1996+
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and the financial sector, were not very vulnerable to exchange-rate changes, but
highly vulnerable to changes in the interest rate+A large proportion of firms in this
export-oriented but financially domestic-oriented economy specializes in high-
value-added and high-tech exports for which imported inputs are of relatively mod-
est importance+ This resulted, on average, in a low competitiveness0purchasing
power vulnerability to depreciation of exporting firms+47 More domestically ori-
ented firms were more vulnerable to real price changes, especially to increases in
the price of oil, but because Taiwan’s fairly sound macroeconomic fundamentals
made a currency collapse of the proportions seen in the other Southeast Asian
countries unlikely, their vulnerability was only moderate+ There was even less rea-
son to worry about balance-sheet vulnerability to depreciation+ Taiwanese compa-
nies had not borrowed substantial amounts in foreign currency48 and foreign assets
greatly exceeded foreign liabilities in 1997+49 Balance sheets would consequently
gain rather than suffer from an exchange-rate depreciation, resulting in a low
balance-sheet vulnerability to depreciation for a large majority of Taiwanese firms
and individuals+ In contrast, the balance sheets of most Taiwanese firms and indi-
viduals were vulnerable to interest-rate increases+ A history of high savings had
enabled Taiwanese companies to borrow predominantly in domestic currency, mak-
ing the domestic interest rate the main determinant of the debt burden+50 The main
sources of financing were bank loans, the informal financial market, and Taiwan’s
dynamic capital market, in which one in three Taiwanese—both individuals and
companies—had invested in 1997+51 Since the performance of the Taiwanese stock
market was highly sensitive to interest-rate increases, the interest-rate vulnerabil-
ity for stock investors was on average quite high+ The interest-rate vulnerability of
SMEs varied a lot, but on average they were more leveraged than large corporations+
This Taiwanese vulnerability structure resulted in a low vulnerability to depre-
ciation and a moderate to high vulnerability to monetary tightening for most Tai-
wanese firms and individuals+ Since my argument suggests that the vulnerability
to monetary tightening will be discounted as long as pressure is mild, it predicts
that in the tranquil0mild-pressure period, which lasted until the early fall of 1997,
most Taiwanese actors ~except the export-oriented SMEs! should perceive them-
selves slightly more vulnerable to depreciation than to a defense, resulting in a
weak preference for defense+ The argument predicts that, in this specific setup,
the authorities should also exhibit a weak preference for exchange-rate stability+
This is precisely the Taiwanese experience: when market jitters caused by the
floating of the Thai baht in July 1997 began to exert speculative pressure on
Taiwan’s currency, the New Taiwan ~NT! dollar, early in the fall 1997, the Tai-
47+ Author’s interview 10+
48+ Between 1993 and 1996, external liabilities of the private sector averaged only 10+6 percent of
gross domestic product ~GDP!; see Chu 1999, 186+
49+ Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini 1999, 339+
50+ Hsu 2001+
51+ Chu 1999+
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wanese authorities responded by selling several billion U+S+ dollars of their size-
able foreign reserves+ Taiwanese central bankers and politicians defined
“maintaining financial stability” ~defined as exchange-rate, interest-rate, and stock-
market stability! as their policy priority+52 As long as pressure remained mild,
Taiwan’s central bank, the Central Bank of China ~CBC!, was able to achieve all
of these goals by sterilizing most of its foreign reserve sales+ Convinced that the
currency was appropriately valued, the authorities were initially even willing to
temporarily accept modestly higher short-term interest rates in return for exchange-
rate stability+53
As speculative pressure grew more severe in October and monetary tightening
became inevitable to maintain exchange-rate stability, the actual vulnerability
became the salient determinant of policy preferences+ The argument predicts that
actors’ low tolerance for pain inflicted by interest-rate increases and their low vul-
nerability to depreciation should lead to a change in policy preferences from
exchange-rate stability toward depreciation+ The available evidence points to such
a shift in preferences and to a corresponding change in official policy+ Since reserve
sales were not fully sterilized, the resulting credit squeeze began to hurt the econ-
omy, in particular the stock market in September+ As high interest rates and the
continuous outflow of foreign funds began to take a heavy toll on the stock mar-
ket in October, the public debate in Taiwan increasingly centered on the trade-off
between stock-market performance and currency stability+54 On 8 October 1997,
the leaders of the nation’s major industry and commerce associations publicly called
for lower interest rates, a demand that was echoed by stock buyers+55 At the same
time, exporters increasingly and successfully lobbied the national parliament for a
depreciation+56 In such a situation, the vulnerability argument predicts that exchange-
rate stability will promptly be abandoned in order to stabilize interest rates+ In
fact, the calls for a depreciation did not remain unheard+ Faced with the choice to
either further raise interest rates or to stop defending the NT dollar, the authorities
chose the latter option on 17 October 1997 and let the currency depreciate “in
order to minimize the adverse impact on the real sector and on financial mar-
kets+”57 This decision was made even though the authorities still held very large
funds of foreign currency reserves and although exchange-market pressure was
not ~yet! particularly severe+58
The Taiwanese experience illustrates how a low tolerance for painful monetary
tightening in combination with a strong export-orientation and a comparatively
low balance-sheet vulnerability to depreciation can rapidly turn initial weak pro-
52+ China Post, 5 September 1997, 8 September 1997, and 9 October 1997+
53+ China Post, 9 October 1997+
54+ China Post, 6 October 1997 and 13 October 1997; and author’s interview 21+
55+ China Post, 9 October 1997+
56+ Author’s interview 20; and China Post, 9 October 1997+
57+ Chen 2000, 56+
58+ IMF 2004+
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defense preferences into strong preferences for depreciation when the pressure on
the exchange rate increases only slightly+ Since most actors valued low interest
rates and competitiveness gains higher than exchange-rate stability, they opted for
monetary stability rather than exchange-rate stability+ In accordance with the pre-
dictions generated by the vulnerability argument, the government was then unwill-
ing to continue defending the currency and depreciated instead+
Thailand: Unsuccessful Defense (I)
The Thai experience was quite different+ During the buildup to the currency crisis
that culminated in a float on 2 July 1997, many Thai firms, in particular the influ-
ential groups of banks, finance companies, and industrial exporters, simulta-
neously exhibited a very high vulnerability to depreciation and to interest-rate
increases—a situation that one IMF official referred to as a “double bind+”59
Thailand’s economy is fairly export-oriented, but the majority of exporters ~67+5
percent of manufacturing exporters, according to a 1998 survey!60 produce indus-
trial goods that require imported inputs, thus decreasing the positive competitive-
ness effect of a depreciation+ While the variance is quite high, a majority of Thai
firms and individuals therefore exhibited a moderate to high degree of competi-
tiveness vulnerability to depreciation+ The balance-sheet vulnerability to depreci-
ation also varied among Thailand’s firms+ The finance companies were the most
vulnerable, followed by banks and big companies with high foreign currency expo-
sure and only limited foreign currency earnings+ Since the capital account liberal-
ization in the early 1990s, considerable amounts of foreign capital had poured
into Thailand+ Relying on the long-standing stability of the baht, financial inter-
mediaries had borrowed substantially in foreign currency and re-lent these—
mostly unhedged61—funds at higher interest rates on the domestic market+62 This
practice resulted in severe currency mismatches, where liabilities denominated in
foreign currency stood against assets denominated in domestic currency+ Having
matched their substantial foreign-currency borrowings with unprofitable invest-
ments in the faltering domestic property sector, the finance companies were most
seriously affected+ For this small, concentrated, and homogenous group of actors,
the stability of the baht rapidly became a “life or death issue+”63 Large exporters
also borrowed substantially in foreign currency but were to some extent “natu-
rally hedged” through their export earnings+ In contrast, because most SMEs did
59+ Author’s interview 5+
60+ Unless otherwise noted these numbers are based on a firm-level data set ~Hallward-Driemeier
2001, own calculations+!
61+ Approximately 80 percent of short-term loans in foreign currency ~almost $38 billion US in
1996! were unhedged+ See IMF 1998d, 78; and Dollar and Hallward-Driemeier 2000+
62+ Tsurumi 2000+
63+ Author’s interview 29+
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not borrow abroad,64 their balance sheets were not very vulnerable to deprecia-
tion+ Other than banks and finance companies, the large majority of Thai firms
still borrowed only in baht—but they did so extensively, resulting in a highly lever-
aged corporate sector+65 Consequently, balance sheets were even more vulnerable
to interest-rate increases than to depreciation66 and “the corporate sector would
have been much more hit by an interest-rate shock than an exchange-rate shock+”67
Interest-rate vulnerability was highest for those who held large baht-denominated
liabilities, most notably large corporations, SMEs, and exporters+ Banks and finance
companies were indirectly exposed because high interest rates increase the ratio
of nonperforming loans+
In sum, a large part of the Thai private sector exhibited a high vulnerability to
both depreciation and monetary tightening+ The vulnerability argument suggests
that until the eruption of severe speculative pressure in May 1997, most groups,
including the two influential groups of finance companies and banks, should per-
ceive themselves to be much more vulnerable to depreciation than to a defense+
Except for the finance companies, however, their actual vulnerability was much
higher when it came to a monetary tightening+ With increasing pressure, actors’
interest-rate and the actual vulnerability become salient, resulting in an increasing
preference for devaluation over an interest-rate defense+
These predicted preferences correspond to those empirically observed: the export
sector voiced concern about the exchange rate, but as pressure increased, balance-
sheet considerations became increasingly important+ While exporters did not
demand depreciation, they clearly preferred depreciation to higher interest rates+68
Businesses producing for the domestic market and consumers worried about the
potential negative effects of a devaluation on the prices of imports+69 Finance com-
panies preferred higher interest rates and were strongly opposed to a devalua-
tion+70 As long as pressure remained mild, Thai banks were strongly opposed to a
devaluation, as the repeated warnings against depreciation issued by the Thai Bank-
ing Association exemplify+71 However, when pressure increased, they were also
opposed to interest-rate hikes+72
64+ In 1998, an average small, nonexporting SME held only 1+6 percent of its total liabilities in
short-term and foreign currency denominated debt, while the average was 16+5 percent for large export-
ing firms ~difference in means is significant at 99 percent level!+
65+ See Dollar and Hallward-Driemeier 2000; and IMF 1998d+
66+ At the end of 1996, a majority of companies had less foreign-currency debt than baht-
denominated debt ~Dollar and Hallward-Driemeier 2000, 12!+ SMEs had a higher domestic interest-
rate exposure than large firms: for 1997, interest rate payments0total sales stood at an average of 6+5
percent for SMEs and 4+7 percent for large firms ~difference in means is significant at 95 percent
level!+
67+ Author’s interview 8+
68+ Author’s interviews 27 and 29+
69+ Hall 2005, 70+
70+ Author’s interview 29+
71+ Bangkok Post, 17 March 1997 and 2 July 1997+
72+ Author’s interview 29+
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Statements from Bank of Thailand ~BOT! and government officials indicate that
the authorities gave much thought to the balance-sheet effects of a potential baht
devaluation, while trade “was not an issue+”73 Starting in summer 1996, Thailand
had experienced a prolonged period of repeated mild speculative attacks on its long-
standing peg, caused by a worsening current account deficit and the piecemeal pol-
icy measures implemented to address weaknesses in the Thai economy+ The BOT
initially fiercely resisted speculative pressure by selling almost all of Thailand’s for-
eign reserves, modestly raising interest rates,74 and even introducing some capital
controls designed to deter foreign speculators+ In February 1997, a BOT official said
that “any policy to devalue the currency would cause more damage to the overall
economy than could be offset by the gains expected from improved price compet-
itiveness+ Most importantly, devaluation would lead to inflationary pressure and
more costly imports+ At the same time, the private sector would find it more diffi-
cult to service overseas debts+”75 This indicates that the BOT’s preferred option
against mild pressure was to stabilize the exchange rate by selling reserves and
simultaneously maintaining interest-rate stability, especially since the central bank
was highly concerned about the large foreign debt held by the private sector+76 At
the same time, the authorities were reluctant to further increase interest rates because
they feared the consequences for the highly indebted financial sector and the real
economy+77 A stark example of such reluctance is the BOT’s dangerous strategy of
sterilizing its reserves sales through massive and secret swap transactions, which
later strongly contributed to the crash of the currency+As the commission set up by
the Thai parliament to investigate the causes of the crisis ~the Nukul Commission!
notes, the purpose of this strategy had been to prevent interest rates from skyrock-
eting+78 In May 1997, the speculative attacks grew severe and the authorities dis-
cussed but nevertheless dismissed the option to stop sterilizing reserve sales, partly
because this would have caused interest rates to rise substantially+79 Instead the
authorities imposed some capital controls for offshore market transactions, which
led to an increase in offshore interest rates but allowed domestic interest rates to
remain stable+80 In fact, a significant increase in interest rates was never seriously
considered+ Interest rates were raised only later as a consequence of IMF condi-
tionality and despite fierce resistance by Thai officials+81 Even with these efforts to
stabilize interest rates, monetary conditions were tight ~by Thai standards, but low
by crisis standards!, which prompted several politicians, including Finance Minis-
73+ Ibid+
74+ Nominal interest rates were not sufficiently raised to deter speculation and some evidence sug-
gests that real interest rates did not consistently increase at all ~Goldfajn and Baig 1998!+
75+ Bangkok Post, 19 February 1997+
76+ See Nukul Commission 1998, 99; Overholt 1999, 1015; and author’s interview 26+
77+ Author’s interviews 5 and 27+
78+ Nukul Commission 1998, 64+
79+ Ibid+, 78f+
80+ Ibid+, 80f+
81+ Blustein 2001+
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ter Amnuay and the Parliaments’ Fiscal Policy, Banking and Finance chairman,
to call for lower interest rates+82 When the pressure continued and the BOT had to
inform the government that hardly any reserves were left, the authorities chose
to float the baht on 2 July 1997+
The Thai crisis offers a classic case of initial, strong defense with a subsequent
depreciation+ The analysis of influential actors’ vulnerability profiles suggests that
changing domestic coalitions of proponents and opponents of depreciation contrib-
uted to the authorities’ decision to switch from a fierce defense of the currency to a
float+High foreign currency mismatches among influential groups and the economy’s
high dependence on imported goods initially led to widespread preferences for
exchange-rate stability+ When defending was no longer viable without significant
interest-rate increases, the high leverage of the private sector and its high overall
balance-sheet vulnerability to monetary tightening offer an explanation of why the
Thai authorities abandoned the defense and chose to float instead+
South Korea: Unsuccessful Defense (II)
Similar to Thailand, the Korean experience in 1997 represents a case of a failed
defense+ Coincidentally, the distribution of perceived and actual vulnerabilities
among Korean firms and households resembles that of Thailand+ Korea’s economy
is highly export-oriented with a focus on technologically advanced, high-value-
added products+ Accordingly, many Korean firms are either exporters or indirectly
linked to exporters as suppliers, making them not particularly vulnerable to the real
price effects of depreciation+ Nontradables producers, the majority of which are
SMEs, have a higher average competitiveness vulnerability to depreciation, espe-
cially when they strongly rely on imported inputs+83 In terms of their balance-
sheet vulnerability to depreciation, SMEs were on average not very exposed, while
the large, export-oriented, and politically influential84 industrial conglomerates ~the
so-called chaebol! and Korean banks had a high balance-sheet vulnerability to depre-
ciation+85 As in Thailand, Korea’s financial-market liberalization in the 1990s had
allowed Korean banks to take advantage of the lower interest rates abroad and bor-
row substantial amounts of foreign short-term money, which they then relent domes-
tically as long-term loans+86 The massive and mostly unhedged currency and term
structure mismatches that resulted from this practice made Korean banks extremely
vulnerable to exchange-rate fluctuations+87 The chaebol also borrowed substantial
82+ See Bangkok Post, 19 February 1997, 20 February 1997, 17 March 1997, 6 April 1997, 25 April
1997, and 2 July 1997+
83+ On average, Korean manufacturers used imported inputs worth 21 percent of total sales in 1996+
84+ The influence of the chaebol originates in their small number, similar and large vulnerabilities,
and traditionally strong ties to the political arena; see Haggard 2000+
85+ Lee, Lee, and Lee 2000+
86+ Blustein 2001+ In 1996, short-term external liabilities of Korea’s financial institutions amounted
to $78 billion US, 16 percent of GDP; see IMF 1998c+
87+ Author’s interviews 7 and 17+
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amounts of money abroad and failed to hedge these debts+While they were highly
vulnerable to depreciation, Korean companies were even more vulnerable to interest-
rate increases+ Debt ratios were extraordinarily high, on average exceeding a stag-
gering 400 percent for the top thirty chaebol, with most of this debt short-term and
in domestic currency+88 The liabilities of SMEs, especially in the nontradables sec-
tor, were almost entirely denominated in won+ SMEs were therefore also vulner-
able to high interest rates, even though the interest exposure of these companies
varied far more than that of the chaebol+89 Overall, the corporate sector was much
more vulnerable to an interest-rate shock than an exchange-rate shock+90 Banks, who
theoretically could pass on higher interest rates to their customers, were indirectly
exposed through their borrowers’ decreasing ability to repay their debts, especially
since many loans to the chaebol were of low quality+91 Since elections were sched-
uled in Korea for mid-December 1997, the vulnerabilities of a fifth group of actors,
the group of voters0consumers, indirectly influenced the authorities’ decision-
making process+ Vulnerabilities in this group varied widely+ On average, however,
consumers were vulnerable to price increases and held most of their debt in domes-
tic, rather than foreign currency, creating a similar overall vulnerability structure
to that of domestically oriented SMEs+
These facts imply that most Korean actors should have perceived themselves
more vulnerable to depreciation than to a defense as long as speculative pressure
could be contained without a tightening of monetary policy+ In the absence of strong
speculative pressure, banks should exhibit the strongest preference for a defense,
closely followed by consumers, nontradables producers and the chaebol, while
export-oriented SMEs should weakly favor depreciation+ However, the actual vul-
nerabilities suggest that all groups except the banks92 should prefer depreciation
in the face of severe pressure+ These predicted preferences largely correspond to
the preferences observed empirically: the chaebol and many SMEs favored a defense
against mild pressure but a depreciation when pressure became severe+93 As soon
as severe speculative pressure emerged, the Federation of Korean Industries, the
chaebol-association, called for lower interest rates+94 This is consistent with the
expectation that the chaebol should exhibit the biggest aversion to an interest-rate
defense+ Banking institutions troubled with bad loans but facing painful conse-
quences either way said that they saw “some need for depreciation” rather than a
marked monetary tightening when pressure had increased95 and called for aid from
88+ IMF 1998b+
89+ Author’s interviews 4 and 12+
90+ Author’s interview 8+
91+ Haggard and Mo 2000+
92+ The argument predicts banks to have been indifferent in the face of severe pressure because
they were equally vulnerable to both depreciation and defense+
93+ Interviews 13 and 19+
94+ Asia Pulse, 23 September 997+
95+ Author’s interview 13+
426 International Organization
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e.
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f B
as
el
 L
ib
ra
ry
, o
n 
11
 Ju
l 2
01
7 
at
 0
7:
31
:5
1 ,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
C
am
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s.
 h
tt
ps
:/
/d
oi
.o
rg
/1
0.
10
17
/S
00
20
81
83
08
08
01
44
the central bank+96 Finally, middle-sized exporters initially did not articulate any
strong preferences, even though some preferred a depreciation+97
The actions taken by the Korean authorities when the won came under increas-
ing speculative pressure in fall 1997 suggest that they were sympathetic to the
private sector’s vulnerabilities+ Korean officials intervened extensively, but inter-
est rates were raised only marginally+98 “We were afraid of the bankruptcies in the
corporate sector,” a Korean central bank official recalls+99 As in Thailand, balance-
sheet concerns outweighed potential competitiveness considerations+100 Initially,
the authorities were chiefly concerned with the impact of a depreciation on for-
eign liabilities+ At the same time, “the Korean government would never have
dreamed of raising interest rates” because of the corporate sector’s high lever-
age+101 In addition, the upcoming elections increased the weight the governments
gave to voters’ preferences, increasing their indirect influence on policymaking+
Even after the speculative attacks intensified at the end of October, the authorities
did not significantly tighten monetary policy and instead abandoned the defense
of the won on 17 November 1997+ Some weeks later, in the negotiations with the
IMF and in the face of a dramatically deteriorating situation, Korean officials still
tenaciously tried to avoid higher interest rates because they were deeply con-
cerned about the potential effects on Korea’s highly indebted corporations but, as
in Thailand, Korean officials ultimately had to accept monetary tightening in return
for an IMF rescue package+102 The Korean case is thus in line with the vulnerabil-
ity approach’s indication that a high depreciation vulnerability of influential actors
initially increases the incentives for the authorities to defend the exchange rate
through sterilized intervention+When pressure intensifies and interest-rate increases
become necessary, an even higher vulnerability to interest-rate increases sub-
sequently changes the incentives to abandon the defense+
Hong Kong: Successful Defense
In Hong Kong, both the perceived and the actual vulnerability of influential actors
was higher to depreciation than to a defense+ As an extremely open economy that
imports almost everything ~including drinking water!, export competitiveness and
the price of imported goods are important issues+ However, since the economy is
highly service-oriented and relies on the city’s function as a key trading port, Hong
Kong’s economic structure differs from those of the other three countries in this
96+ LG Economic Research Institute 1997+
97+ Author’s interviews 16 and 18+
98+ Real interest rates did not considerably increase at all before the depreciation; see Goldfajn
and Baig 1998+
99+ Author’s interview 19+
100+ Author’s interview 8+
101+ Author’s interview 17+
102+ Blustein 2001+
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study+ In 1997, manufacturing accounted for only 7+3 percent of the gross domes-
tic product ~GDP!, while services, especially financial service industries ~banks
and nonbank financial services! made up 84+4 percent of GDP+103 In contrast to
export-oriented manufacturing firms, the competitiveness of service-oriented firms
is generally not very sensitive to ~real! exchange-rate movements+104 As a regional
financial center, Hong Kong’s international competitiveness is determined by two
alternative factors: financial stability and competitive domestic prices such as wages
and property prices+ In this context, the currency board plays a pivotal role, reduc-
ing volatility, uncertainty, and transaction costs+Abandoning the exchange-rate link
would seriously threaten this stability and would thus result in a marked loss, rather
than gain, in competitiveness for most of Hong Kong’s service-oriented firms+ It
would also seriously undermine the attractiveness of Hong Kong stocks and prop-
erty as international investment venues+ A depreciation was also likely to fuel a
further increase in the already high domestic asset prices+
In contrast, an interest-rate defense in the context of the region’s highly flexi-
ble labor markets would lead to asset price and wage deflation and consequently
a boost in Hong Kong’s competitiveness+105 In terms of competitiveness and real
price considerations, giving up the currency board and devaluing the Hong Kong
dollar was therefore likely to be advantageous for a few firms, most notably in
manufacturing and tourism, but would have detrimental effects on the competi-
tiveness of influential companies in the financial and trading services, as well as
on the stock market and the property sector+ Compared to this high level of com-
petitiveness vulnerability, the balance sheet of the average Hong Kong firm was
less vulnerable to depreciation+ Even though both the financial and the real sec-
tor hold considerable foreign-currency assets and liabilities, these were largely
matched in 1997, implying that most balance sheets were only modestly exposed
to depreciation+ Balance sheets were more vulnerable to interest-rate increases,
especially because Hong Kong dollar-denominated liabilities mostly have vari-
able interest rates+106 Property and stock investors, a heterogenous group that made
up a majority of Hong Kong’s citizens and firms, making stock and property prices
an important determinant of household spending,107 were most vulnerable to higher
interest rates+ The high capitalization and prudent regulation of Hong Kong banks,
by contrast, meant that high interest rates would mainly affect their profitability
rather than their solvency+ Moreover, since companies in Hong Kong were on
average less leveraged than their counterparts in the region, these effects were
unlikely to be as lethal+108 Nevertheless, most actors exhibited at least some vul-
nerability to a monetary tightening+
103+ Hong Kong Industry Department 1999+
104+ One notable exception is the tourism industry+
105+ IMF 1997, 10+
106+ IMF 1997+
107+ IMF 1998a+
108+ Carse 1998+
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Most actors therefore exhibited both a high perceived and actual vulnerability
to depreciation+ The best-organized groups, banks and financial-service firms in par-
ticular,109 exhibited very homogenous and high vulnerabilities to depreciation+ This
suggests that all of these groups ~except for the export sector! should have favored
a defense regardless of the severity of speculative pressure+ These predicted pref-
erences coincide with the preferences voiced in the public debate+ In October 1997,
the chairman of the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce suggested that the
authorities should “rethink the peg,” to ease the problems of the local tourism and
manufacturing industries+110 This comment prompted immediate rebuttals from the
financial sector+ The Chairman of HSBC Holdings said that the peg was a great force
of stability and should therefore be defended+111 A representative of Hong Kong
Bank maintained that the crisis had been inspired by a loss of competitiveness, which
indicated a need for domestic adjustment ~including wage restraint and property
price deflation!, rather than for a devaluation+112 Even though the losses inflicted
by the sharp fall in property and stock prices hurt most residents of Hong Kong,
support for the currency board remained high+113 Given the stock market’s high vul-
nerability to interest-rate increases, however, the stock-market intervention in August
1998 received widespread support as local and foreign investors were “grateful for
the protection of their asset values+”114
Policymakers were aware of the private sector’s preferences when the specula-
tive attacks on the Hong Kong ~HK! dollar hit the currency between July 1997
and August 1998+115 During that year, the authorities made it clear that exchange-
rate stability was their top policy priority+ They consistently stressed their commit-
ment to the currency board and dismissed demands by exporters for devaluation+
Financial Secretary Sir Donald Tsang emphasized very early that he had “no wish
to meddle with @the# exchange rate to please the exporters+”116 In a move that
paralleled the preferences of firms in the financial services sector, the authorities
allowed interest rates to rise sharply, with the overnight rates surging to a peak of
280 percent on 23 October 1997+ Even though these high rates plunged the Hong
Kong economy into recession, the authorities continued to rely on tight monetary
policy as their main tool for defending the currency+117 At the same time, policy-
makers were not immune to the plight of small-scale property owners, influential
property developers, and industrialists+118 When speculative pressure resurfaced
in 1997, the authorities decided in a surprise move to heavily intervene in the
109+ Author’s interview 10+
110+ South China Morning Post, 22 October 1997+
111+ South China Morning Post, 24 October 1997+
112+ South China Morning Post, 25 October 1997+
113+ Interviews 11 and 27+
114+ Lim 1999, 105+
115+ Particularly severe speculative attacks occurred in October 1997 and June and August 1998+
116+ South China Morning Post, 24 October 1997+
117+ IMF 1997, 11+
118+ Lim 1999+
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stock market to keep stock prices from falling while simultaneously maintaining
exchange-rate and interest-rate stability, providing another example of how soci-
etal preferences can indirectly affect policy outcomes+119 This strategy allowed
Hong Kong to successfully defend its currency board+
The vulnerability approach gives one a handle for explaining the authorities’
willingness to bear the painful consequences of the currency defense: even though
the balance sheets of most actors were more vulnerable to interest-rate increases
than to depreciation, the negative long-term competitiveness effects associated with
abandoning the currency board outweighed the balance-sheet considerations in Hong
Kong+ This resulted in an overall preference for exchange-rate stability+ When the
pain caused by interest-rate increases became too intense, the authorities found a
way to relieve interest-rate pressures without compromising their commitment to
the fixed exchange rate by intervening in the stock market+ While this approach is
unconventional and was possible only because of Hong Kong’s extraordinarily high
level of public funds, the stock-market intervention is consistent with the private-
sector vulnerability approach+
Conclusion
The nuanced approach for identifying exchange-rate level preferences presented
in this article has argued that actors’ vulnerabilities to depreciation and monetary
tightening shape these preferences, which in turn influence whether policymakers
choose to maintain exchange-rate stability or to depreciate their currencies+ Case
studies of four Asian countries during the financial crisis of 1997–98 demonstrate
that interest group preferences can be identified based on the interaction of com-
petitiveness and purchasing power concerns, balance-sheet vulnerabilities, and the
severity of exchange-market pressure+
Table 2 summarizes the preferences based on groups’ perceived and actual vul-
nerabilities in each of the four countries under study+ Because most economic
actors in Taiwan were not very vulnerable to a depreciation, they were mostly
indifferent or had only weak preferences about exchange-rate policy+ Since their
balance sheets were much more vulnerable to interest-rate increases, however,
they mostly developed a strong preference for depreciation over an interest-rate
defense when pressure increased+ While highly vulnerable to depreciation, many
influential Thai and Korean firms were even more vulnerable to interest-rate
increases+ This made them unwilling to tolerate a significant monetary tighten-
ing, even though they had initially strongly supported a defense of the currency
through reserve sales+ In contrast, the paramount importance of exchange-rate
stability for Hong Kong’s financial-service firms can explain their strong pro-
119+ The stock market intervention was highly controversial at the time ~author’s interviews 10 and
11!+
430 International Organization
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e.
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f B
as
el
 L
ib
ra
ry
, o
n 
11
 Ju
l 2
01
7 
at
 0
7:
31
:5
1 ,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
C
am
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s.
 h
tt
ps
:/
/d
oi
.o
rg
/1
0.
10
17
/S
00
20
81
83
08
08
01
44
defense preference during both mild and severe pressure periods, and their will-
ingness to endure the painful consequences of very high interest rates in Hong
Kong+ Table 2 shows that the biggest change in preference coalitions occurred in
the two countries that chose the costly middle way of first defending and then
depreciating the exchange rate ~Thailand and Korea!+ Table 2 also represents how
the traditional approach of assuming that tradables producers prefer a depreci-
ated currency, while nontradables producers prefer an appreciated exchange rate,
does not capture important variations among the preferences of these groups+
TABLE 2. Comparison of private-sector preferences in mild-pressure and
severe-pressure periods
Country and outcome Defense Indifferent Devaluation
Preferences based on perceived vulnerabilities (mild pressure)
Taiwan
(depreciation)
• SMEs*
• Stock market
investors*
• Financial sector
• Large corporates
Thailand
(unsuccessful
defense)
• Finance companies*
• Banks*
• Large corporates*
• SMEs
South Korea
(unsuccessful
defense)
• Banks
• Chaebol*
• Consumers0voters
• Nontradables SMEs
• Export-oriented
SMEs
Hong Kong
(successful
defense)
• Banks*
• Nonbank
financial services*
• Stock market investors
• Property owners
• Exporters
Preferences based on actual vulnerabilities (severe pressure)
Taiwan
(depreciation)
• Financial sector • SMEs*
• Stock market
investors*
• Large corporations
Thailand
(unsuccessful
defense)
• Finance companies*
• SMEs
• Banks*
• Large corporations*
South Korea
(unsuccessful
defense)
• Consumers0voters
• Nontradables SMEs
• Banks
• Chaebol*
• Export-oriented
SMEs
Hong Kong
(successful
defense)
• Banks*
• Nonbank
financial services*
• Stock market
investors*
• Property owners
• Exporters
Notes: * indicates the most influential groups ~as identified by experts!+ Chaebol large, export-oriented, and influ-
ential industrial conglomerates+ SMEs  small- and medium-sized enterprises+
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By mapping the changing pattern of coalitions in favor of defenses or depreci-
ations to the actual policy outcomes, the case studies indicate that societal prefer-
ences directly or indirectly affect policy outcomes+ When the private sector’s
vulnerability to depreciation was high, the authorities typically defended the
exchange rate+ In countries where vulnerabilities to interest-rate increases exceeded
the vulnerability to depreciation, these defenses were later abandoned when pres-
sure intensified+ Vulnerability considerations thus contribute to the understanding
of the tragic cases of the Thai and Korean crises, in which the authorities defended
the currency for a prolonged period only to allow it subsequently to depreciate
substantially—in the process causing people to experience the worst of both worlds+
While the lack of accurate firm-level data on vulnerability structures, exchange-
rate preferences, collective action, and the level of influence exerted on policy-
makers limit the explanatory power of these case studies, the results nevertheless
suggest that the vulnerability approach is useful for understanding the variation in
exchange-rate level preferences across different actors and across time in the four
Asian countries during this financial crisis+
The framework’s applicability is not limited to these cases+ Because of its generic
focus on actors’ vulnerabilities, it can be applied to exchange-rate level prefer-
ences in very different socioeconomic contexts, such as in developing and devel-
oped countries where the actors’ balance sheets are likely to exhibit quite different
compositions of foreign and domestic positions+ For example, the prompt 1992
devaluation in Britain occurred in a setting where a depreciated exchange rate prom-
ised large competitiveness gains and where homeowners, who almost exclusively
held British pound-denominated mortgages, were extremely sensitive to interest
increases+ Another example is Argentina, where the government’s defense of the
peso-U+S+ dollar link against speculative attacks in 1995 coincides with a large
accumulation of U+S+ dollar-denominated loans by local businesses, public agen-
cies, and citizens and hence a high balance-sheet vulnerability to depreciation+ In
contrast, in 2002 when the authorities decided to abandon the currency board, real
overvaluation had made Argentine products so uncompetitive that competitive-
ness concerns had surpassed the balance-sheet concerns+
The findings in this study have implications for some broader political econ-
omy research questions+ First, they underscore the importance of understanding
how societal preferences directly or indirectly influence policymakers’ willing-
ness to implement certain policies+ A correct specification of the relevant prefer-
ences complements and improves explanations focusing on the macroeconomic
and institutional decision-making context that delineate policymakers’ ability to
implement exchange-rate and monetary policy+120 Second, by emphasizing how
short-run concerns can outweigh the long-run benefits of exchange-rate adjust-
ments, the findings draw attention to the importance of combining time asymme-
tries and distributional concerns in the study of exchange-rate politics+While time-
120+ See Leblang 2003; and Broz and Frieden 2001+
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inconsistent policymaking is usually analyzed in the context of institutions that
encourage policymakers to discount the future, the vulnerability approach sug-
gests that a short-term bias can exist in policy preferences as well+ Political econ-
omy research consequently needs to investigate in more detail the interplay between
distributional issues and time-inconsistent incentives created by institutions+ Cer-
tain institutions such as elections can, for example, be expected to enhance the
influence of societal actors’ bias for their short-term vulnerabilities, while other
institutions ~such as central bank independence! are likely to counteract this ten-
dency by promoting a more long-term view+121 Third, this study raises several ques-
tions for future research+ One of these concerns policymakers’ preferences+ Given
the importance of balance-sheet considerations, how does a government’s debt sit-
uation affect its policy preferences? Another question concerns speculators+ To what
extent is the fact that speculative pressure emerges endogenous to interest groups’
vulnerability structures? Given that countries such as Thailand and Korea were
easy targets for speculators because of their reluctance to raise interest rates, should
one not see a particularly high risk of currency crisis in countries in which per-
ceived and actual vulnerabilities widely diverge?
The results also have several policy implications+ First, policymakers and pol-
icy advisors need to understand that societal preferences can provide powerful
incentives to deviate from economically efficient outcomes, with potentially
destructive effects not only for these countries but the entire global exchange-
rate system+ Ignoring these incentives makes the implementation of good eco-
nomic policies difficult at best and impossible at worst+ International policy
advisors, such as IMF staff, have often been scolded for advocating one-size-fits-
all policies in response to crises+ The findings presented in this article suggest
that a stronger consideration of the political constraints under which domestic
policymakers operate is likely to improve the ease with which the recommended
policies can be implemented politically+ While the desirability of some of these
constraints may be debatable, taking them into account will lead to more feasible
policy advice+ Second, while it is important to recognize these political con-
straints, some of them can be alleviated if addressed in good time+ For example,
the findings show that large unhedged foreign currency liabilities can lead to a
policy bias against timely devaluations+ To avoid such a bias, policymakers should
introduce measures to prevent the accumulation of such liabilities in the first place+
This could be achieved by implementing more carefully designed and well-
sequenced capital account liberalization measures or by designing regulatory sys-
tems that encourage hedging and discourage the accumulation of large currency
or maturity mismatches+ The findings presented in this study suggest that preven-
tion is the key to preserving policy autonomy in the face of speculative pressure+
As an added benefit, such increased autonomy makes speculative attacks less likely
in the first place+
121+ For example, Willett 2007; and Walter and Willett 2007+
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Appendix: List of Interviewees
For the interviewees listed below, titles were those held during the crises ~current titles are
denoted by an asterisk!+ Interview numbers in the text do not correspond to the order of
names in this list+ Three additional interview partners asked for full anonymity and are
therefore not personally identified in this list:
• Caroline Atkinson, Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Monetary and
Financial Policy, U+S+ Treasury+
• Paul Blustein, Journalist, Washington Post+
• Jack Boorman, Director, Policy Development and Review Department, IMF+
• Michael S+F+ Chang, Senior Specialist,* International Funding Division, Department
of Foreign Exchange, Central Bank of China, Taiwan+
• Robert Dekle, Economist, Asia and Pacific Department, IMF+
• Kokwang Huh, Director, International Department, Bank of Korea+
• Ho Lok Sang, Director of the Centre for Public Policy Studies,* Lingnan University,
Hong Kong+
• Kang Kyong Sik, Minister of Finance and the Economy, Korea+
• Kim Jung-Sik, Professor of Economics,* Yonsei University, Korea+
• Donald Kirk, Journalist, Korea+
• Timothy Lane, Policy Development and Review Department, IMF+
• Calvin Lin, Professor of Economics,* Taichung National Institute of Technology,
Taiwan+
• James Lister, Director, Office of International Monetary Policy, U+S+ Treasury+
• Min Sang Kee, Professor of Finance,* Seoul National University, Korea+
• Ekniti Nitithanprapas, Fiscal Policy Office,* Ministry of Finance, Thailand+
• Oh Jong-Nam, Executive Director,* IMF+
• Oh Jung-Gun, Deputy Director General, Institute for Monetary and Economic
Research, Bank of Korea+
• Olarn Chaipravat, Chairman of the Thai Bankers’ Association, Thailand+
• David O’Rear, Chief Economist for the Economist Intelligence Unit Asia, Hong
Kong+
• David Robinson, Division Chief for Thailand, Asia and Pacific Department, IMF+
• Anoop Sing, Deputy Director, Asia and Pacific Department, IMF+
• Thitithep Sitthiyot, Ministry of Finance,* Thailand+
• Frank Tsai, Department for Foreign Exchange,* Central Bank of China, Taipei,
Taiwan+
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• Wanda Tseng, Deputy Director, Asia and Pacific Department, IMF+
• Ya-Hwei Yang, Director,* Center for Economic and Financial Strategies, Chung-Hua
Institution for Economic Research, Taiwan+
• Eddie Yue, Executive Director,* Monetary Management and Infrastructure Depart-
ment, HKMA, Hong Kong+
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